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Abstract: A Direct method of computing mixed form Nash equilibria of a normal
form game by using a simple evolutionary algorithm is proposed. The Direct Evo-
lutionary Search algorithm (DES) uses a generative relation for Nash equilibria with
binary tournament selection and uniform mutation. Numerical experiments are used
to illustrate the eﬃciency of the method.
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1 Introduction
The problem of computing Nash equilibria of normal form games is one of the most challenging
problems faced by computer scientists. The complexity of this problem - varying hugely from a
type of game to another - is still studied.
Normal form games can be solved by modern heuristics by transforming them into an op-
timization or ﬁxed point problem [2]. An interesting challenge consists on designing a method
that solves the game directly, as a game and not as a corresponding optimization problem.
The main problem in directly approaching the Nash equilibria is caused by the fact that
there does not exist an order (or even preorder) relation deﬁned for game situations that can
guide a search operator towards the Nash equilibrium. While any kind of optimization endeavor
is driven by a corresponding order (or preorder) relation deﬁned in the objective space, in the
case of Nash equilibria the lack of such a relation limits the design possibilities of computational
heuristics.
However, recently [1] a generative relation for Nash equilibria - called the Nash ascendancy
relation - has been proposed. The Nash ascendancy relation is deﬁned on strategy proﬁles. Even
if it does not induce an actual order, numerical results indicate that it is capable of guiding a
search operator towards Nash equilibria.
Nash equilibria - deﬁnition and generative relation
Nash equilibrium [4] is the most popular solution concept in noncooperative game theory. A
ﬁnite strategic game is deﬁned by a set o players, a set of strategies available to each player and
a set of payoﬀ functions for each player and denoted by Γ = (N,S,U) where:
• N represents the set of players, N = {1, ...., n}, n is the number of players;
• for each player i ∈ N , Si represents the set of actions available to him, Si = {si1 , si2 , ..., simi }
where mi represents the number of strategies available to player i and S = S1×S2×...×SN
is the set of all possible situations of the game;
• for each player i ∈ N denote by pij the probability that he selects its j-th action, j ∈
{1, ...,mi}. Then Pi = (pi1, ..., pimi) represents a probability distribution over the set of
actions of player i and P = (P1, ..., Pn) represents a mixed strategy proﬁle for the game,
where pij ∈ [0, 1] and
∑mi
j=1 pij = 1, ∀i = 1, N and ∀j = 1,mi;
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• for each player i ∈ N , ui(P ) represents the expected payoﬀ for the mixed strategy P ;
Denote by (Qi, P ∗−i) the strategy proﬁle obtained from P
∗ by replacing the probability dis-














A strategy proﬁle P ∈ S for the game Γ represents a Nash equilibrium [2,4] if no player has
anything to gain by unilaterally changing his own strategy while the others do not modify theirs.
Several methods to compute NE of a game have been developed. For a review on computing
techniques for the NE see [2] and [6].
Nash ascendancy relation
A generative relation for Nash equilibria is a relation between two strategy proﬁles that
enables their comparison with respect to the Nash solution concept, i.e. it evaluates which one
is "closer" to equilibrium. In [1] such a generative relation has been introduced and shown that
solutions that are non-dominated/ascended with respect to this relation are exactly the Nash
equilibria of the game.
Consider two mixed strategy proﬁles P and Q and the operator κ that associates the cardi-
nality of the set
κ(P,Q) = |{i ∈ {1, ..., n}|ui(Qi, P−i) ≥ ui(P ), Qi 6= Pi}|
to the pair (P,Q), i.e. the number of players i that would beneﬁt from unilaterally switching
their strategies from Pi to Qi.
The operator κ can be used to induce a relation on the set of mixed strategy proﬁles in the
following manner: we can say that the strategy proﬁle P Nash ascends the strategy proﬁle Q in
and we write P ≺N Q if the inequality
κ(P,Q) < κ(Q,P )
holds, i.e. there are les players that can increase their payoﬀs by switching their strategy from P
to Q than vice-versa. It can be said that strategy proﬁle P is more stable (closer to equilibrium)
then strategy Q.
Regarding the Nash ascendancy relation, two strategy proﬁles P and Q may be in the fol-
lowing situation:
1. P ascends Q: P ≺N Q (κ(P,Q) < κ(Q,P ))
2. Q ascends P : Q ≺N P (κ(P,Q) > κ(Q,P ))
3. or κ(P,Q) = κ(Q,P ) and P and Q are considered indiﬀerent (neither P ascends Q nor Q
ascends P ).
The strategy proﬁle P ∗ is called non-ascended in Nash sense (NAS) if there does not exist
any mixed strategy proﬁle Q such that
Q 6= P ∗ and Q ≺N P ∗.
A very important result in [1] shows that for pure strategies all non-ascended strategies are
NE and also all NE are non-ascended strategies. The proof in the case of mixed strategies is
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similar and direct. Thus the Nash ascendancy relation can be used to characterize the equilibria
of a game and can be considered as a generative relation for NEs.
The Nash ascendancy concept was introduced with the purpose to compare two strategy
proﬁles [1] during the search of an evolutionary algorithm in order to compute NEs of a game.
Consider two strategy proﬁles P ∗ and P from ∆. Then k : ∆ ×∆ → N associates the pair
(P ∗, P ) the cardinality of the set
k(P ∗, P ) = card{i ∈ {1, ..., n}|ui(Pi, P ∗−i) > ui(P ∗), Pi 6= P ∗i }.
This set is composed by the players i that would beneﬁt if - given the strategy proﬁle P ∗ - would
change their strategy from P ∗i to Pi.
It is obvious that for any P ∗, P ∈ S, we have
0 ≤ k(P ∗, P ) ≤ n.
Deﬁnition 1. Let P,Q ∈ ∆.We say the strategy proﬁle P Nash ascends Q and we write P ≺ Q
if the inequality
k(P,Q) < k(Q,P ),
holds.
Remark 1.1. Two strategy proﬁles P,Q ∈ ∆ can have the following relation:
1. either P Nash ascends Q,
2. either Q Nash ascends P,
3. if k(P,Q) = k(Q,P ) then P and Q are indiﬀerent
Deﬁnition 2. A strategy proﬁle P ∗ ∈ S is called non-dominated with respect to the Nash
ascendancy relation (NNS) if
∄Q ∈ ∆, Q 6= P ∗such that Q ≺ P ∗.
Deﬁnition 3. The set of all Nash nondominated strategy proﬁles with respect to the Nash
ascendancy relation is the set containing all nondominated strategies i.e.
NND = {s ∈ S|s Nash non-dominated with respect to the Nash ascendancy relation}
Proposition 1. A strategy proﬁle P ∗ ∈ ∆ is a NE iﬀ the equality
k(P ∗, Q) = 0,∀Q ∈ ∆,
holds.
Proof: Let P ∗ ∈ ∆ be a NE. Suppose there exists Q ∈ ∆ such that k(P ∗, Q) = w, w ∈
{1, ..., n}. Therefore there exists i ∈ {1, ..., n} such that ui(Qi, P ∗−i) > ui(P ∗) and Qi 6= P ∗i ,
which contradicts the deﬁnition of NE.
For the second implication, let P ∗ ∈ ∆ such that ∀Q ∈ ∆, k(P ∗, Q) = 0. This means that for
all i ∈ {1, ..., n} and for any Qi ∈ Pi we have ui(Qi, P ∗−i) ≤ ui(P ∗). It follows that P ∗ is a NE. ✷
Proposition 2. All NE are Nash nondominated solutions (NND) i.e.
NE ⊆ NND.
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Proof: Let P ∗ ∈ ∆ be a NE. Suppose that there exists a strategy proﬁle P ∈ ∆ such that P ≺
P ∗. It follows that k(P,P ∗) < k(P ∗, P ). But k(P ∗, P ) = 0, therefore we must have k(P,P ∗) < 0
which is not possible since k(P,P ∗) denotes the cardinality of a set. ✷
Proposition 3. All Nash nondominated solutions are NE, i.e.
NND ⊆ NE.
Proof: Let P ∗ be a nondominated strategy proﬁle. Suppose P ∗ is not NE. Therefore there must





holds. Let’s denote by Q = (Pi, P ∗−i). It means that k(P
∗, Q) = 1. But k(Q,P ∗) = 0. Therefore
k(Q,P ∗) < k(P ∗, Q) which means that Q ≺ P ∗ thus the hypothesis that P ∗ is nondominated is
contradicted. ✷
Using propositions 2 and 3 it is obvious that the next result holds:
Proposition 4. The following relation holds:
NE = NND,
i.e. all NE are also Nash nondominated and also all Nash nondominated strategies are NE.
Direct evolutionary search
The Direct Evolutionary Search (DES) algorithm is a simple evolutionary algorithm based
on tournament selection and uniform mutation designed for Nash equilibria detection.
Individuals represent strategy proﬁles of the game. Real valued encoding is used. Each
individual is represented as a vector composed of (
∑n
i=1mi) components between 0 and 1. For
each individual n corresponding payoﬀs are computed.
Selection Binary tournament selection is used in the following manner: For each individual i,
another one k is selected randomly. If individual k Nash ascends individual i, k is selected and
copied in a separate population of children P ′.
Mutation Uniform mutation with probability pm is applied to all children in P ′. With prob-
ability pm all strategies are modiﬁed (±) with ε. If the resulting value is lower than 0, it is set
to 0. If it is higher than 1, it is set to 1.
Termination condition DES runs either a maximum number of generations which is a pa-
rameter of the algorithm and depends on the problem, either until no child can replace a parent
for 100 generations. For this the variables CountReplacements and control in Algorithm 1 are
used.
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CountReplacements+ =no of children that replace a parent;
if nrgen = 100 then









Table 1: Description of the seven games tested
Name of game No. of players No. of strategies Type of NE
GAME1 2 2,2 totally mixed
GAME2 2 2,2 totally mixed
Matching pennies 2 2,2 totally mixed
G1 3 2,2,2 totally mixed
G2 3 3,3,3 mixed
O’Neill 2 4,4 totally mixed
Poker 2 4,2 totally mixed
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of numerical results obtained by DES using the following param-
eters: population size 50, pm = 0.5, ε = 0.5.
GAME1
Avg. dist: 0 St dev: 0
Avg. no. gen.: 844.33 St dev: 476.57
Avg. eval.: 447,117.47 St dev: 271909.88
GAME3
Avg. dist: 7.75094E-17 St dev: 3.13E-17
Avg. no. gen.: 501.00 St dev: 141.42
Avg. eval.: 243,736.93 St dev: 74416.31
Matching pennies
Avg. dist: 0 St dev: 0
Avg. no. gen.: 497.67 St dev: 125.12
Avg. eval.: 233,854.53 St dev: 56641.84
G1
Avg. dist: 4.04061E-11 St dev: 2.25E-17
Avg. no. gen.: 11,941 St dev: 13424.39
Avg. eval.: 15,541,134 St dev: 17317631
G2
Avg. dist: 4.04061E-11 St dev: 6.98E-18
Avg. no. gen.: 931 St dev: 324.70
Avg. eval.: 1,076,041 St dev: 374858.2
Oneill
Avg. dist: 2.79146E-05 St dev: 0.0001
Avg. no. gen.: 8,217.63 St dev: 26628.89
Avg. eval.: 6,556,652.7 St dev: 21598601
Poker
Avg. dist: 3.70074E-18 St dev: 1.99E-17
Avg. no. gen.: 794.33 St dev: 240.73
Avg. eval.: 419,827.93 St dev: 126713.48
2 Numerical results
DES was ﬁrst tested on a set of simple well known 2 or 3-players with up to 4 actions available
to them. The games have been chosen from the GAMBIT [3] set of normal form games. The
characteristics of the games are presented in Table 1. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the
results obtained using DES for the seven games: average and standard deviation values for the
minimum distance to the NE of the game for the Non Ascended solutions in the ﬁnal population,
number of evaluations and of generations until DES stopped the search.
The second set of games that was used to test if DES was generated by using the GAMUT
distribution [5]. The distribution names, characteristics and rates of success of DES are presented
in Table 3.
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Table 3: GAMUT distributions and results obtained by DES. Rate of success represents percent
of runs in which DES detected a NE. Parameters of DES: population size 100, pm = 0.1
Distribution No. of players No. of actions Rate of success
Bertrand 2 10/player 100%






Bidirectional LEG 2 10/player 100%






Bidirectional LEG 2 10/player 100%






Bidirectional LEG 2 10/player 100%






Covariance Game 2 10/player 100%
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Conclusion
The presented results indicate that it it possible for an evolutionary algorithm to directly
detect Nash equilibria of normal form games. A population composed of situations of the game
is randomly generated; using selection and mutation operators and the Nash ascendancy relation
individuals of the populations are guided towards the Nash equilibrium of a normal form game.
Two sets of problems have been chosen to test the method: the ﬁrst one consists of games
presenting a mixed Nash equilibrium. Results indicate that DES is capable of locating mixed
equilibria for the selected games. The second group of games is used to test the scalability of
the method: the number of actions available to each player, as well as the number of players
are increased for ﬁve distributions available in the GAMUT package. Results also indicate the
potential of the method, inspite of well known scalability issues associated with evolutionary
algorithms.
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